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ABSTRACT 
 
THE EFFECT OF SEXIST HUMOR ON WOMEN’S SOCIAL INFLUENCE 
Kyle Richardson, B.S. 
Western Carolina University (April 2015) 
Director: Dr. Thomas E. Ford 
 
For people high in sexism, humor that disparages women diminishes women and trivializes 
discrimination against them (Ford, Boxer, Armstrong, & Edel, 2008).  The present study builds 
on the existing findings by examining how sexist humor affects the degree to which women can 
exert social influence in a virtual Asch line-judgment paradigm.  Latane (1981) demonstrated 
that a person’s status affects the degree to which he or she can influence others; higher status 
people can exert greater social influence.  The participants’ level of conformity was measured by 
the number of times they conformed to incorrect line-judgments given by female confederates 
following exposure to either sexist or neutral humor.  I hypothesized that by trivializing and 
diminishing women, sexist humor has status-lowering effects and weakens women’s ability to 
exert social influence, resulting in less conformity from men high in hostile sexism.  My 
hypothesis was not supported.  The results revealed no significant main or interaction effects of 
hostile sexism, type of humor, or sex of the confederate on conformity. 
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l 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
“Discrimination is made up of tiny acts that position women as less than human. It is not 
about men with cigars meeting to decide ‘Hmmm, we hate women, how can we keep 
them down today?’” 
Anonymous (2011) 
 
Recent events have highlighted the prevalence and controversy of sexist humor in public 
comedy routines.  For instance, comedian Seth MacFarlane, host of the 2013 Academy Awards, 
received scathing reviews for his sexist comedy bits that included rape jokes punctuated by a 
song-and-dance number called, "We Saw Your Boobs" 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NTKEDXNQAcc).  Similarly, in 2013, comedian Daniel 
Tosh was criticized and subsequently apologized for directing a rape joke at a female audience 
member at the Laugh Factory in Los Angeles.  Also in 2013, Filipino comedian, Vice Ganda, 
apologized for making weight jokes and rape jokes about a local female newscaster to a large 
arena audience.   
In a recent interview with CNN, Journalist Lindy West responded to the use of sexist 
humor—humor that denigrates women—by saying, “It’s not just a joke.  It does not just exist on 
your twitter and go away.  Things have real life consequences.”  Empirical research validates 
Lindy West’s and the general public’s suspicion that sexist jokes can be more than “just a joke.”  
By making light of rape, discrimination of women, and sexual objectification of women, sexist 
humor functions as one of those “tiny acts” that diminishes women and thus has important social 
consequences.  In fact, sexist men (those who have some antagonism against women) exposed to 
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sexist jokes or comedy skits versus other stimuli (e.g., sexist statements, neutral jokes, neutral 
comedy skits) reported greater: (a) acceptance of rape myths (Ryan & Kanjorski, 1998), (b) 
tolerance of sexist events (Ford, 2000; Ford, Wentzel, & Lorion, 2001), (c) rape proclivity 
(Romero-Sanchez, Durán, Carretero-Dios, Megías, & Moya, 2010; Thomae & Viki, 2013), (d) 
willingness to discriminate against women (Ford, Boxer, Armstrong, & Edel, 2008), and (e) 
greater acceptance of societal sexism (Ford, Woodzicka, Triplett, & Kochersberger, 2013).   
The present study builds on the existing findings by examining how sexist humor affects 
the degree to which women can exert social influence.  Latane (1981) demonstrated that a 
person’s status affects the degree to which he or she can influence others; higher status people 
can exert greater social influence.  I hypothesize that by trivializing and diminishing women, 
sexist humor reduces their status and thus their ability to exert social influence.   
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The Effect of Disparagement Humor 
Stereotypes and prejudice.  Prejudice involves an evaluative prejudgment, usually 
negative, of a person or group of people based on their membership in a certain social category 
(Allport, 1954; Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002).   Stereotypes are mental associations 
between a social category and various attributes that represent one’s beliefs about members of 
that group (Devine, 1989).  One way that a person may express his or her prejudice is through 
the use of disparagement humor. 
 Disparagement humor is humor that denigrates and belittles members of certain social 
groups (Janes & Olson, 2000; Zillmann, 1983).  Humor theorists have traditionally argued that 
exposure to disparagement humor creates and reinforces negative stereotypes and prejudice 
toward the targeted group (e.g., Berger, 1993; Freud, 1905/1960; La Fave & Mannell, 1976; 
Meyer, 2001; Ruscher, 2001; Stephenson, 1951; Zenner, 1970).  In fact, Freud (1905/1960) 
believed that humor was a tool for one to express his or her aggressive feelings in socially 
acceptable ways.  Similarly, Stephenson (1951, p. 570) described the function of humor to 
“express common group sentiments, develop and perpetuate stereotypes…and express collective, 
sub rosa approbation of action not explicitly approved.”  Accordingly, empirical research on the 
detrimental consequences of exposure to disparagement humor focused initially on how it affects 
stereotypes and attitudes toward disparaged targets.  Empirical studies revealed complex and 
surprising findings. 
Weston and Thomsen (1993), for instance, found that participants made more 
stereotypical evaluations of men and women after watching sexist comedy skits than after 
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watching neutral comedy skits.  In a similar vein, Ford (1997) found that when White 
participants were exposed to negative stereotypical portrayals of African-Americans, they were 
more likely to make negative evaluations of an African-American person.  Ford (1997) subjected 
participants to five comedy skits from a popular television show that either contained negative 
stereotypical portrayals of African-Americans or contained no stereotypical content.  After 
watching the comedy skits, participants read a vignette describing a college student who was 
accused of assaulting another student.  The name “Tyrone” was given to the defendant in one 
condition to make him appear African-American while the name “Todd” was used in the other 
condition to elicit the image of a White defendant.  Participants rated the African-American 
defendant significantly guiltier after watching comedy skits that employed negative stereotypes 
of African-Americans (i.e., poor, uneducated, and prone to violence) than after watching neutral 
comedy skits.  Together, the studies by Weston and Thomsen (1993) and Ford (1997) suggest 
that negative group stereotypes are activated by viewing stereotypical comedy skits, and those 
stereotypes can affect social perceptions.  
The designs of these studies, however, did not allow one to make conclusions about the 
unique effects of humor beyond any other form of negative disparagement.  In fact, the findings 
on the effect of disparagement humor were interpreted as negative priming effects.  Olson, Maio, 
and Hobden (1999) designed three experiments to address these limitations and further examine 
whether disparagement humor changes stereotypes and/or increases stereotype accessibility. 
In Experiment 1, female subjects read either disparaging or nondisparaging cartoons 
based on stereotypes of men.  Of the 15 cartoons in the “disparaging” condition, five employed 
the “domestic laziness” and “domestic incompetence” stereotypes while two other cartoons were 
disparaging toward men without using stereotypes.  The other eight were nondisparaging 
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cartoons.  In the nondisparaging condition, all 15 cartoons used nondisparaging humor involving 
domestic topics like dishwashing and care-taking.   
After reading the cartoons, participants read a paragraph describing ambiguous behaviors 
conducted by a male character “Larry”.  The paragraph described behaviors that were potentially 
interpretable as lazy and even hostile in some situations.  Participants evaluated Larry’s behavior 
on 16 trait dimensions.  Then, participants were asked to confirm or deny the accuracy of 
personality traits directed at men and women.  A computer program measured their response 
latency; shorter response latency meant that the stereotypes were more accessible to the 
participant.  Finally, participants answered how strongly they felt those traits described men and 
women. 
Olson et al. (1999) found no significant effects of disparagement humor on participants’ 
ratings of Larry’s behaviors.  Specifically, participants did not interpret his behaviors as any 
more stereotypical than participants who read nondisparaging cartoons.  Also, Olson et al. (1999) 
found that disparaging cartoons did not make male stereotypes more accessible to female 
subjects, nor did they view male stereotypes more extremely than subjects in the nondisparaging 
condition. 
The second experiment expanded upon Experiment 1 and added new dimensions to be 
measured.  There were four conditions instead of two, and the original disparaging and 
nondisparaging conditions were altered to show either only disparaging cartoons or 
nondisparaging cartoons instead of a mix.  In the two new conditions, participants received either 
no cartoons, or they read plain, disparaging statements toward men. 
Immediately afterwards, participants again rated the ambiguous behavior of the men they 
read about.  Four sentences referenced male stereotypes from the cartoons, four mentioned male 
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stereotypes not in the cartoons, and four sentences were fillers.  Each rating was given through a 
computer program that recorded their responses and response latencies.  Then, attitude extremity 
and accessibility was measured by participants’ answers on semantic differential scales assessing 
how “unfavorable/favorable”, “negative/positive”, etc. they felt towards the targeted group.  
Again, shorter response latencies meant greater stereotype accessibility. 
Olson et al. (1999) found no evidence that exposure to disparaging cartoons elicited more 
stereotypical responses from female participants.  They also concluded that male stereotypes 
were no more severe or accessible to the subject after reading disparaging cartoons.  The only 
significant finding was that female participants who read disparaging cartoons expressed less 
favorable attitudes toward men.  Despite a stronger manipulation of disparagement humor, 
Experiment 2 only yielded one significant interaction effect. 
In Experiment 3, Olson et al. (1999) targeted lawyers in disparaging cartoons rather than 
men.  They posited that occupational stereotypes may produce better results than gender 
stereotypes due to less familiarity with the profession.  The procedure, measures, and analyses 
followed the previous experiment.  Unlike Experiment 2, however, participants did not express 
more negative attitudes toward the targeted group (lawyers) following disparagement humor.  
There were also no significant differences in stereotype or attitude accessibility.   
In summary, these experiments did not support the idea that exposure to disparagement 
humor can affect one’s stereotypes and attitudes toward a social group.  However, Olson et al. 
(1999) only targeted groups who have traditionally held high social status (men and lawyers).  
They discussed the idea that targeting disadvantaged groups, such as women, may yield a 
stronger effect of disparagement humor.  Another limitation of Olson et al.’s (1999) experiments 
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is that each participant’s level of prejudice was not measured.  It could be that those high in 
prejudice are more susceptible to the effects disparagement humor may have on a person.   
Ford, Wentzel, and Lorion (2001) designed an experiment to address these limitations 
and more fully investigate the effect disparagement humor may have on one’s stereotypes and 
attitudes toward a social group.  Specifically, they found that even men high in “hostile sexism” 
– antagonism against women (Glick & Fiske, 1996) – did not report more negative stereotypes of 
women following exposure to sexist humor versus neutral humor or non-humorous sexist 
statements.  Together, Olsen et al. (1999) and Ford et al. (2001) provide no evidence that 
exposure to disparagement humor creates or reinforces negative stereotypes and prejudice 
toward the targeted group 
Social Consequences of Disparagement Humor: Prejudiced Norm Theory  
Although exposure to disparagement humor does not appear to affect internal sources of 
self-regulation (i.e., attitudes and stereotypes), Ford and Ferguson (2004) proposed that 
disparagement humor does, indeed, have negative social consequences.  Ford and Ferguson 
(2004) provided a “prejudiced norm theory” which hypothesizes that, for people high in 
prejudice, disparagement humor creates a norm tolerant of discrimination and allows one to 
release his/her prejudice more freely.   
The theory is comprised of four propositions that explain how humor is a unique medium 
through which a group can be denigrated without the fear of reprisal.  First, it proposes that 
humor triggers a “conversational rule of levity” (Ford & Ferguson, 2004) by which people adopt 
a non-critical “humor” mindset to interpret a given message rather than the usual serious, literal 
mindset.  Mulkay (1988) suggested that when in the humor mindset, people abandon the rules of 
logic and expectations of common sense.  Consequently, people do not process a joke as they 
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would serious communication.  Zillmann and Cantor (1976/1996), for instance, asserted that the 
“club over the head” is funny when the protagonists are clowns in cartoons but not when they are 
police officers responding to a riot (p. 105).  Likewise, Berlyne (1972) stated that, 
Humor is accompanied by discriminative cues, which indicate that what is happening, or 
it going to happen, should be taken as a joke.  The ways in which we might react to the 
same events in the absence of these cues become inappropriate and must be withheld (p. 
56). 
Disparagement of a social group through humor, then, communicates an implicit message that in 
this context the underlying expression of prejudice should be interpreted in a playful, non-serious 
manner (Gollob & Levine, 1967; Mutuma, La Fave, Mannell, & Guilmette, 1977).  In contrast, 
non-humorous disparagement does not activate a playful humor mindset.  Consequently, people 
will react to serious expressions of prejudice in a usual, critical manner.  Bill and Naus (1992) 
found that men viewed incidents of sex discrimination as harmless and acceptable when they 
were considered to be humorous. 
Second, if a person accepts the disparagement humor and switches to a non-critical, 
humor mindset to interpret it, he or she assents to a social norm implied by the humor that it is 
acceptable in this particular context to make light of discrimination (Ford & Ferguson, 2004; 
Ford, Woodzicka, Triplett, Kochersberger, & Holden, 2014).  Emerson (1969), for instance, 
suggested that using jokes to communicate socially unacceptable sentiments is a way for those 
involved to suspend the typical, serious norms attached to such attitudes.  However, the recipient 
may think it inappropriate to make light of the expression of prejudice (Apte, 1987; Barker, 
1994; Mannell, 1977; Sev’er & Ungar, 1997), and therefore reject the normative standard 
implied by the humor (Attardo, 1993; Francis, 1988).  If the recipient does reject the 
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disparagement humor and refuses a non-critical humor mindset, he or she should be less likely to 
perceive a shared norm of tolerance of discrimination (Ford & Ferguson, 2004).  In keeping with 
this hypothesis, Ford (2000, Exp. 2) found that only when jokes are read in a non-critical mindset 
does the tolerance of sexism increase.  Before participants read a vignette containing either 
humorous or non-humorous sexist or neutral content, some were instructed to focus on the 
underlying messages of the jokes.  Ford (2000, Exp. 2) found that the instructions caused 
participants (even those high in hostile sexism) to reject the levity of the sexist jokes and 
maintain intolerant responses to the sexist vignettes.  It was concluded that an increased 
tolerance of sexism only occurs when humor is allowed to create a non-critical atmosphere.   
The third proposition of Prejudice Norm Theory maintains that one will interpret 
disparagement humor in a non-critical mindset to the extent that he or she holds prejudice toward 
the disparaged group.  Highly prejudiced people have less internalized non-prejudice convictions 
and are more externally motivated (e.g., through social norms) to respond in a non-prejudice 
manner (e.g., Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002; Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & 
Vance, 2002; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993; Plant & Devine, 1998).  Prejudiced Norm 
Theory predicts that weakly internalized non-prejudice convictions make one less likely to reject 
disparagement humor and therefore more likely to adopt a non-critical mindset when evaluating 
discrimination.  In support of this proposition, Greenwood and Isbell (2002) revealed that sexist 
participants found sexist jokes more amusing and less offensive than non-sexist participants.  
Similarly, Ford (2000, Exp. 3) found that when participants were not instructed to read sexist 
vignettes in a critical mindset, highly prejudiced participants viewed sexist humor as no more 
offensive than neutral humor, and were less offended by sexist jokes than non-sexist participants. 
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Lastly, Prejudice Norm Theory posits that a prejudiced individual is more likely to 
perceive and assent to a new prejudiced norm implied by sexist humor in the immediate context, 
and use that norm as a basis for how they respond toward the targeted group (Ford et al., 2008; 
Ford et al., 2001; Ford & Ferguson, 2004; Thomae & Viki, 2013). Vidmar and Rokeach (1974) 
provided early evidence that people perceive disparagement humor differently depending on 
their level of prejudice.  They discovered that non-prejudiced participants interpreted the bigoted 
humor of All in the Family’s Archie Bunker as lampooning Archie while prejudiced participants 
interpreted the humor as lampooning the target of Archie’s disparagement humor.   
Recent research has more directly studied the connection between prejudice and the 
interpretation and consequences of disparagement humor.  Ford and Ferguson (2004), for 
instance, demonstrated that people interpreted sexist humor in a non-critical humor mindset to 
the extent that they held sexist attitudes toward women.  In a study by Thomae and Vicki (2013), 
the negative effect of sexist humor was limited to men high in hostile sexism.  They showed that 
only men high in hostile sexism reported greater rape proclivity upon exposure to sexist versus 
neutral humor (Exp. 2).  Also, Ford et al. (2008) found that men higher in hostile sexism 
discriminated against a women’s organization upon exposure to sexist but not neutral humor.  
Specifically, hostile sexist men allocated greater budget cuts to a woman’s student organization 
upon exposure to sexist versus neutral comedy skits.  Furthermore, this effect was mediated by a 
perceived local norm of tolerance of discrimination against women.  Upon exposure to sexist 
humor, hostile sexist participants used the emergent “prejudiced norm” in the immediate context 
to guide their own discriminatory behavior.   
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Summary statement.  While disparagement humor does not appear to create prejudice 
against the targeted group, it does have negative social consequences.  By making light of 
prejudice, disparagement humor creates an environment of unspoken approval or tolerance of 
discrimination against a targeted group.  Highly prejudiced people who are exposed to 
disparagement humor are more likely to accept the denigrating humor, perceive a norm that is 
tolerant of prejudice, and use that norm to guide their own responses toward the targeted group. 
Social Influence and Conformity 
Deutsch and Gerard (1955) defined two types of social influence that a group exerts upon 
an individual: informational influence and normative influence.  A group has informational 
influence when an individual is unsure of how to respond in a given situation and relies on the 
group for information or guidance.  Not surprisingly, a group’s informational influence is 
strongest in novel settings in which the appropriate or “right” response is highly ambiguous or 
unclear, and when the individual perceives the group as credible (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 
2007).  Informational influence induces private acceptance conformity—a change in an 
individual’s public behavior and privately held personal beliefs in accordance with a group 
norm.  The individual truly believes that the group norm provides the best response in an 
uncertain situation.   
Sherif (1935) took advantage of the auto-kinetic effect (an optical illusion where a steady 
beam of light shown on a wall of a dark room appears to move) in his seminal study to 
demonstrate how informational influence and private acceptance conformity can occur.  It is 
noteworthy that judgments of how far the spot of light moves are highly ambiguous because 
there is no reference point from which to judge the distance.  Sherif conducted the experiment in 
three phases.  First, three individuals were placed in separate dark rooms and were asked to judge 
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how far a beam of light appeared to move on a series of trials.  Participants developed their own 
standards of how far the light typically moved.  In phase two, the three participants were brought 
into the same room and were asked to make the judgments as part of a group.  After a few trials, 
the individuals converged on a group norm they used to estimate how far the light moved.  In 
phase three, the group was separated again and the individuals were asked to give their 
judgments independently.  The individuals’ judgments still conformed to the group norm in 
private, demonstrating private acceptance conformity.  The individuals adopted the group norm 
as their own. 
Normative influence is defined as “an influence to conform with the positive expectations 
of another” (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).  In other words, people conform to fit in, be approved, 
and not be an outcast.  The strength of a group’s normative influence is not derived from the 
ambiguity of a novel setting.  Rather, a group’s normative influence is strongest when an 
individual desires approval from the group (Aronson et al., 2007).  Normative influence induces 
public compliance conformity—a change in an individual’s public behavior in accordance with a 
group, but not a change in privately held personal beliefs.  The individual merely acts in 
accordance with a group norm to avoid social rejection (Janes & Olson, 2000).  
The most famous experiments investigating normative influence and public compliance 
conformity were conducted by Solomon Asch (1951; 1956).  In one variation of his experiment, 
the participant arrived at his lab and sat among seven confederates.  The experimenter explained 
to them that they would be completing a test of visual perception, and displayed a picture of a 
“target” line.  Then, he presented three comparison lines and asked the participants to estimate 
which comparison line was the same length as the target line.  For the first couple trials, the 
participant and confederates correctly chose the line that matched the target.  However, on the 
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third trial, all confederates unanimously gave the wrong answer prior to the participant’s 
judgment.  The group was no longer in agreement with the participant, who was feeling marked 
distress about opposing the group’s influence.  Although participants believed their own 
judgments were correct, they conformed to the group’s incorrect answer 33% of the time.  One 
participant even stated in a post-experiment interview, “I felt I was definitely right…[but] they 
might think I was peculiar” (Asch, 1956).  From the participant’s responses, it was clear that 
normative influence could have significant effects on one’s behavior.  Even if a person does not 
agree with a group’s behavior, he or she may still be publicly compliant in order to maintain the 
group’s approval. 
Social impact theory.  Latane (1981) developed the social impact theory (SIT) to specify 
the principles that moderate a group’s ability to exert normative influence and induce public 
compliance conformity.  The three principles discussed in his theory are immediacy, number, 
and strength.  Immediacy is defined by how close in space and time the group is to the target.  
Deutsch and Gerard (1955) demonstrated that conformity to a group norm dropped when the 
experimenters added partitions to create space between participants and confederates.  The 
second component, number, refers to the size of the influencing group.  Asch’s (1951) study on 
conformity showed that the number of group members necessary to exert normative influence on 
an individual is three.  Having fewer than three people in the group caused public compliance 
conformity to dwindle, and adding more than three members did not increase conformity. 
Latane (1981) defined strength as “the salience, power, importance, or intensity of a 
given source to the target – usually this would be determined by such things as the source’s 
status, age, socioeconomic status, and prior relationship with, or future power over, the target.”  
The more strength a group has, the more normative influence it can exert.  For instance, Latane 
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and Harkins (1976) manipulated the strength of a group by varying the age of its members.  They 
found that audiences in their late thirties exerted more normative influence than audiences in 
their teens, and therefore created more tension in participants who visualized giving a speech to 
one of the two age groups.  
Relevant for my research, an important implication of Latane’s (1981) theory is that a 
group’s strength to exert normative influence can be weakened when the group is demeaned or 
trivialized.  Sexist humor demeans women as a group and therefore should reduce their strength 
to exert normative influence in the immediate context.  Furthermore, men high in hostile sexism 
are most likely to accept the diminishment of women implied by sexist humor.  It follows that 
men higher in hostile sexism are more likely to perceive women as less able to exert normative 
influence following exposure to sexist humor.  In an Asch line-judgment task using female 
confederates, then, exposure to sexist humor reduces women’s ability to induce public 
compliance conformity among hostile sexist men. 
The Proposed Research 
 The present research tested the hypothesis that men higher in hostile sexism would 
conform less to a group of women after exposure to sexist versus neutral humor.  This effect 
should be attenuated for a group of men.  Men should not differentially conform to a group of 
men after exposure to either sexist or neutral humor as a function of hostile sexism.  I tested this 
hypothesis by asking male participants to complete two separate studies.  In the first, they 
watched either sexist or neutral comedy skits.  In the second study, I conducted a conceptual 
replication of Asch’s (1951) line-judgment study within a virtual world using an application 
known as Second Life (Rayburn-Reeves, Wu, Wilson, Kraemer, & Kraemer (2013).  
Specifically, participants chose an avatar to represent themselves, and to interact with three 
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alleged female participants, each represented by a different female avatar.  The participants 
completed ten trials of the Asch line-judgment task.  Using their avatars, the alleged female 
participants unanimously gave the wrong answer on four trials.  I measured the number of 
critical trials on which participants conformed to the group by giving the same wrong answer.  I 
predicted that there would be a negative relationship between participants’ level of hostile 
sexism and their percentage of conforming judgments in the sexist humor condition, but not the 
neutral humor condition, when the confederates were female.  I did not expect to find any 
relationship between hostile sexism and conformity in either the sexist or neutral humor 
conditions when the virtual confederates were males. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHOD 
 
Participants and Design 
 Eighty-one male students over 18 from Western Carolina University were recruited using 
the WCU participant pool.  Each participant received course credit for his participation.  
Participants’ age ranged from 18 to 30 with a median of 19 and a mean of 19.19 (SD = 1.94). 
There were 66 Whites, eight African Americans, four Hispanics, and two people of “other” 
descent.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (type of humor: 
sexist, neutral) x 2 (sex of confederates: male, female) factorial design.  To estimate minimum 
sample size, I conducted power analyses using G*Power 3 software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007).  I assumed an α of .05, power of .80 and a medium effect size (Cohen’s f2 = 
.15).  The power analysis suggested that I needed a minimum of 77 participants distributed 
across four conditions. 
Confederate Participants 
 Participants were told that they would be working with three other students from Western 
Carolina University, each located in different rooms.  The alleged “three other students” were 
actually virtual avatars controlled by the experimenter.  The experimenter used the confederate 
avatars to provide line-judgment responses for each trial.  The confederate avatars represented 
female participants in the female confederate conditions, and male participants in the male 
confederate conditions. 
Materials and Measures 
Hostile sexism.  Each participant’s level of hostile sexism was measured through Glick 
and Fiske’s (1996) Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI).  See Appendix A for a complete copy of 
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the ASI.  The questionnaire was administered as a “Social Attitudes Survey” to supposedly 
assess attitudes about certain social issues.  The ASI is composed of 22 statements to which 
participants indicate their agreement on a 6-point scale (ranging from 0 = strongly disagree to 5 
= strongly agree).  Eleven of the statements measure hostile sexism – antagonism toward women 
(Glick & Fiske, 1996).  One such statement reads, “Women seek to gain power by getting 
control over men.” 
Humor manipulation.  Participants were asked to rate the funniness of a set of videos 
involving either sexist or neutral (non-sexist) humor, depending on the condition they are 
assigned to.  In each condition, the comedy videos were comprised of four separate comedy 
clips, and the total time of each video is approximately 4:20.  Participants rated each clip on a 7-
point scale ranging from 1 (not at all funny) to 7 (very funny).    
 In the neutral humor condition there were no disparaging content in the video.  The 
neutral comedy video featured an E*Trade baby commercial, a home video of a baby laughing 
and making funny faces at sounds made by its mother, a humorous Snickers commercial 
featuring Betty White participating (poorly) in a game of back-yard football, and lastly, a skit in 
which a recently hired male supervisor introduces himself to his employees.  He tells them of his 
phobia of spoons and asks the employees to refrain from using spoons or even saying the word, 
spoon, in his presence.  Suddenly, an unknowing employee walks into the room raising a spoon 
from his coffee cup.  A yell is heard, and when the camera pans back to the new boss, there is 
only an open window.  His spoon phobia had caused him to jump out the window and he fell to 
his death.  See Appendix B for a link to the neutral comedy videos. 
 In the sexist humor condition, the first comedy segment consisted of the non-disparaging 
"spoon phobia" skit described above (included to reduce suspicion of the purpose of the study); 
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the remaining three clips portrayed women as inferior to men and as sex objects that are judged 
on shallow criteria like their physical appearance.  One of the sexist comedy skits featured 
comedian Daniel Tosh stating “that women can do anything that men can do except” and then 
reciting a long list of things such as “math,” “making money,” “being tall” and “being 
funny…on purpose.”  The second sexist skit humorously portrayed women in “wife school” 
where they learn how to “keep quiet,” “stop spending (his) money” and “put their husbands’ 
needs first.”  In the skit, the women are transformed from “normal wives" who were devaluated 
by their husbands into very thin, sexually provocative young women desired by their husbands.  
There are also humorous testimonials from the husbands and wives explaining how great “wife 
school” was for their marriage.  Finally, the last sexist comedy skit featured a man and a woman 
conversing at a party.  The man obviously pays little attention to the woman who is describing 
her job, and finally interrupts by saying, "I'm not at all interested in what you have to say, but 
you're a very attractive young lady and it’s nice to have you here for decorative purposes…”.  
The man continues his rant by stating, "You're not very important so I cannot be bothered to talk 
to you, unless of course your father or husband is important, in which case I would be prepared 
to patronize you for a few minutes for the sake of your important connections."  When the 
woman responds that she is not married and her father is unemployed, the man quips, "Well, 
there you are then.  You are a very attractive waste of time!  Oh, unless of course you want to 
sleep with me."  See Appendix B for a link to the sexist comedy videos. 
  The comedy videos from both conditions were pre-tested by Ford et al. (2014) on the 
following dimensions:  (a) funniness, (b) the degree to which it disparaged (made fun of) 
women, (c) the degree to which it depicted women as sex objects, and (d) the degree to which it 
depicted sexist stereotypes.  Participants provided their answers on scales ranging from 1 (not at 
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all) to 7 (extremely).  The sexist clips were rated as more sexist, than the neutral clips, and the 
four neutral clips were rated as funnier than the three sexist clips (Ford et al., 2014).     
Asch line-judgment task in a virtual environment.  The Asch line-judgment was 
disguised as a test of visual perception.  I utilized a virtual world application known as Second 
Life to create virtual environments and avatars that represented the participants’ physical 
presence. 
A virtual room was created that resembled Asch’s (1951) conformity study.  There were 
four chairs in the center of a room with a large white screen in front of it where the line 
judgments were be presented (see Figure 1).  Directly below the screen, there were three gray 
blocks engraved with the letters “A,” “B,” and “C” (see Figure 2).  The letters corresponded to 
three comparison lines that participants compared to a target line.  Participants and confederates 
specified which of the three comparison lines matched the length of the target line by walking 
their avatar to the appropriate block.  They completed two practice trials with the confederates to 
practice moving their avatar with the keyboard arrow keys.  After the practice trials there were 
six “control” trials on which each confederate gave the correct answer, and four “critical” trials 
on which each confederate gave the same wrong answer.  The confederates always provided 
their answer before the participant.  Conformity was operationally defined by the number of 
times participants conformed to the confederates’ incorrect responses on the critical trials.  
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Figure 1.  The seating arrangement for avatars in the virtual lab. 
 
 
Figure 2.  The virtual view of an Asch line-judgment trial. 
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Support for virtual environment use.  The use of virtual environments in scientific 
research has been increasingly promoted and examined during recent decades (e.g., Biocca & 
Levy, 2013).  Blascovich, Loomis, Beall, Swinth, Hoyt, and Bailenson (2002) even argued that 
social psychologists have been creating virtual environments for over 50 years by developing 
props, using confederates, and creating illusions.  In the current electronic age, social scientists 
have begun using computers and the internet as new means to create virtual environments.  
Numerous virtual, online environments (e.g., Second Life, Cyberball) have been shown to 
reliably produce social psychological phenomena such as conformity, ostracism, social 
exclusion, and rejection, validating the use of virtual environments in psychological research 
(Biocca & Levy, 2013).   
Procedure 
My experiment closely followed the procedures of Rayburn-Reeves et al. (2013).  At the 
start of the experiment, the participant met the experimenter in a room on WCU’s campus.  First, 
under the guise of a separate, unrelated experiment, each participant completed Glick and Fiske’s 
(1996) Ambivalent Sexism Inventory to measure their level of hostile sexism.  Second, the 
participant was asked rate the funniness of a few videos for a future pilot study.  The videos were 
viewed on a lab computer and involved either sexist comedy skits or neutral comedy skits.  Next, 
the second part of the study was described as a visual perception test.  The experimenter guided 
the participant to log into Second Life and join a virtual room.  The participant selected an avatar 
that closely resembled their own personal appearance.  Then, in the female confederate 
condition, they met three female avatars controlled by the experimenter who the participant was 
told were real students from Western Carolina University.  In the male confederate condition, 
participants met three male avatars.  In the virtual room, the participant used the keyboard arrow 
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keys to direct his avatar to sit in a virtual chair beside the three confederates.  Directly in front of 
the avatars there was a virtual display screen where the line judgments were shown.  Following 
Rayburn-Reeves et al. (2013), the experimenter then provided the following instructions for the 
participant:  
You will be shown an image in which there will be a target line on the left side and three 
comparison lines of different length on the right side, labeled A, B, and C. Your task is to 
locate the comparison line that matches the target line in length. Once the test image has 
appeared for a brief period, it will disappear, and another image will appear with the 
letters A, B, and C directly above stone blocks labeled A, B, and C. When told to do so 
by the experimenter, please move your avatar to the stone block representing your 
stimulus choice (p. 5). 
When an avatar indicated his/her answer, he or she remained standing on that block until all 
other avatars answered too.  The avatars then returned to their chairs to view the next trial.   
The participant completed two practice trials followed by 10 total trials (six control trials and 
four critical trials).   
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
 
Preliminary Analyses 
Thirty participants indicated suspicion of the true purpose of the study.  To determine if 
“suspicious” participants responded differently on the dependent measure from non-suspicious 
participants, I conducted a 2 (sex of confederate: male, female) x 2 (type of humor: sexist, 
neutral) x 2 (suspicion: suspicious, not suspicious) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the 
measure of conformity.  There was a significant main effect of suspicion, F (1, 73) = 16.28, p 
<.001, partial eta2 = .18, showing that the suspicious participants conformed to fewer trials (M = 
.33, SD = 0.54) than non-suspicious participants (M = 1.37, SD = 1.24).  Furthermore, the 
suspicious participants were disproportionately distributed across the sexist humor condition (n = 
19) and neutral humor condition (n = 11).  On the basis of these findings, I excluded the 
suspicious participants from all subsequent analyses. 
Hostile Sexism 
 I constructed an overall measure of hostile sexism for each participant by averaging their 
scores on the Hostile Sexism Scale in Glick and Fiske’s (1996) Ambivalent Sexism Inventory.  
Cronbach’s alpha was .85 exceeding Nunnally’s (1978) criteria of acceptable reliability of .70.   
The overall mean score was M = 2.48 (SD = .67).  Mean hostile sexism scores were M = 2.43 
(SD = .59) in the sexist humor condition and M = 2.52 (SD = .73) in the neutral humor condition.  
A 2 (type of humor: sexist, neutral) x 2 (sex of confederates: male, female) ANOVA on the 
hostile sexism scores revealed no effect of experimental condition, all F’s, p>.10. 
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Conformity 
I predicted that, in the female confederate condition, hostile sexism would significantly 
predict the amount of conformity in the sexist humor, but not neutral humor condition.  In the 
male confederate condition, I expected that hostile sexism would not be significantly related to 
conformity in either the sexist or neutral humor conditions.  See Figures 3 and 4. 
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Figure 3.  Predicted change in conformity to female confederates. 
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Figure 4.  Predicted change in conformity to male confederates. 
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To test my hypothesis, I first dummy coded the humor variable (sexist humor = 1, neutral humor 
= 0) and the sex of confederates variable (male = 1, female = 0).  Next, I computed interaction 
terms by multiplying the standardized hostile sexism score by each dummy coded variable.  
Finally, I regressed the measure of conformity (the number of critical trials on which participants 
conformed to the wrong group judgment) onto the standardized hostile sexism score, type of 
humor manipulation, sex of confederate manipulation, all the two-way interactions and the 
hostile sexism x type of humor x sex of confederates interaction effect.  In keeping with my 
hypothesis, I expected to find a significant 3-way interaction effect. 
As can be seen in Table 1, the regression analyses revealed no significant main or 
interaction effects.  Importantly, the predicted three-way interaction effect was not significant β 
= -.245, SE = .851, t = -.866, p = .391.  Figures 5 and 6 depict the regression lines for the number 
of critical trials on which participants conformed to the confederates’ incorrect line judgments as 
a function of type of humor and standardized hostile sexism scores. 
 
 
  27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Summary of the regression analysis on the measure of conformity. 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta   
1 
(Constant) .193 .265  .730 .469 
Confederate (A) .516 .424 .240 1.216 .231 
Humor (B) 
HS (C) 
.147 
-.183 
.436 
.280 
.069 
-.142 
.337 
-.653 
.737 
.517 
AxB -.732 .657 -.282 -1.114 .271 
AxC .794 .482 .396 1.649 .107 
BxC .288 .595 .131 .485 .630 
AxBxC -.737 .851 -.245 -.866 .391 
      
a. Dependent Variable: Conformity 
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Figure 5.  Observed change in conformity to female confederates. 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Low (-1 SD) High (+1 SD)
N
um
be
r 
of
 C
ri
tic
al
 T
ri
al
s 
on
 w
hi
ch
P
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 C
on
fo
rm
Hostile Sexism
Sexist Humor
Neutral
Humor
 
Figure 6.  Observed change in conformity to male confederates 
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To further test my hypotheses, I examined the relationship between hostile sexism and 
conformity to the male and female confederates’ judgments in each of the two humor conditions 
on the first critical trial.  According to my hypothesis I predicted that there would be a significant 
negative relationship between hostile sexism and conformity to the female confederates’ 
incorrect line judgments in the sexist humor condition, but not the neutral humor condition.  
Contrary to my prediction, there was no relationship between hostile sexism and conformity to 
the female confederates’ incorrect line judgments in the sexist humor condition or the neutral 
humor condition, (point-biserial r = .051, p = .874, point-biserial r = -.199, p = .445, 
respectively). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 
 
This experiment tested the hypothesis that men higher in hostile sexism would conform 
less to a group of women after exposure to sexist versus neutral humor.  Furthermore, I 
hypothesized that men would not differentially conform to a group of men after exposure to 
either sexist or neutral humor as a function of hostile sexism. 
The results did not support my hypotheses.  Regressing the measure of conformity onto 
the standardized hostile sexism score, type of humor manipulation, sex of confederate 
manipulation, all the two-way interactions and the hostile sexism x type of humor x sex of 
confederates interaction effect revealed no significant main or interaction effects.  Participants’ 
level of hostile sexism did not predict their conformity to male or female confederates’ incorrect 
line judgments as a function of humor.   
Had my hypotheses been supported, this research would have contributed new knowledge 
about the social consequences of sexist humor.  Specifically, a growing body of research has 
shown that sexist humor fosters discrimination against women among men who normally 
suppress their sexism.  My study tested the possibility that sexist humor has additional 
detrimental consequences for women.  By diminishing women, I reasoned that sexist humor 
reduces women’s ability to exert social influence.  The present research would have provided 
further insight into these effects by showing that exposure to disparagement humor can also 
result in less conformity to a group. 
Significant results would have contributed to the social influence literature by identifying 
a new variable that can reduce a person’s or a group’s strength to exert normative social 
influence.  As stated in Latane’s (1981) social impact theory, immediacy, number, and strength 
 
 
  31 
 
are essential to a group’s social influence.  A group’s ability to exert influence is greatly reduced 
when one of those elements is weakened.  Support for my hypotheses would have shown how a 
targeted group’s strength becomes diminished through disparagement humor, resulting in 
devaluation of the group’s influence. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
There are some important limitations to this experiment.  First, it is not clear that the 
sexist comedy skits in my study actually diminished women in the eyes of the male participants.  
Including a manipulation check would have revealed if the humor manipulation did indeed 
diminish women.  I predicted that diminishment would mediate the relationship between sexist 
humor and the weakening of women’s social influence, so failing to confirm that effect limits the 
interpretation of the present results. 
Second, the research paradigm used allowed for a high number of suspicious participants.  
Analyses revealed a significant main effect of suspicion, showing that the suspicious participants 
conformed to fewer trials than non-suspicious participants.  It is also possible that this data was 
further compromised by suspicious participants who failed to express their suspicion.  The Asch 
line-judgment experiment is very well-known and taught in every introductory psychology class 
at WCU.  Unfortunately, all participants in the present research were recruited from those 
classes.  Perhaps using a task other than line judgments (e.g., counting the number of shapes 
inside geometric figures) would have obscured the familiarity of the paradigm. 
I believe it would be valuable for future research to continue examining the effect of 
disparagement humor on targeted groups’ social influence.  As stated above, instead of using line 
judgments, a potential future study could simply replace the testing stimuli in an Asch line-
judgment paradigm with another task such as counting the number of shapes within a geometric 
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figure.  A less familiar task may reduce suspicion and allow for better examination of the effect 
of sexist humor on a group’s social influence. 
Also, future research could examine the effect of sexist humor on women’s ability to 
exert informational influence.  A group’s ability to exert informational influence depends on its 
credibility.  The less credible one perceives a group the less likely he or she is to rely on the 
group for guidance (Deutch & Gerard, 1955).  If sexist humor diminishes women, then men 
should perceive a group of women as less credible sources of information upon exposure to 
sexist humor.  Consequently, men should be less likely to exhibit private acceptance of 
information provided by women upon exposure to sexist versus neutral humor. 
An experiment could test this hypothesis by presenting male participants with a 
judgmental task for which the accurate or appropriate response is unclear.  For instance, 
participants could be asked to answer a number of extremely difficult trivia questions to which 
they do not know the answers.  Furthermore, participants could be given the opportunity to rely 
on a group’s input (information) or ignore the group’s input.  We predict that insofar as the men 
are sexist, exposure to sexist humor will cause them to ignore information from a female group 
more often compared to a male group. 
Summary and Conclusion 
 The present study set out to contribute to the existing literature on the social 
consequences of sexist humor by investigating the possibility that sexist humor diminishes 
women’s social influence.  Unfortunately, the results of the study were inconclusive, failing to 
provide supportive evidence for my hypotheses.  Future research that addresses the limitations of 
the current study may indeed contribute knowledge of great social relevance. 
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Appendix A:  Consent Form 
Consent Form 
Here are some questions you might have about this study. 
What is the purpose of this research and what will be asked of me? 
You will be taking two separate and independent studies that will be used for our social 
psychology lab. You will first watch a video and rate how funny you believe it is.  Then, you and 
a few other participants will be asked to participate in a visual perception test administered 
through a virtual computer application called “Second Life.” Last, you will complete a 
questionnaire and a short demographic survey.  
How long will the research take? 
The study in total should take 45 minutes or less. 
Will my answers be anonymous?       
Yes.   
Can I withdraw from the study if I decide to? 
Absolutely, and you will still be given credit. 
Is there any harm that I might experience from taking part in the study? 
There is no potential harm from participating in this research. 
How will I benefit from taking part in the research? 
You will satisfy your research requirement or receive extra credit in your PSY 150 course, and 
you will have the satisfaction of knowing you've participated in research that we hope will 
contribute to the body of knowledge in social psychology. Your input will also help us to design 
future studies. 
Who should I contact if I have questions or concerns about the research? 
If you have any questions, you may contact Professor Thomas E. Ford, tford@wcu.edu.  Also, if 
you have any concerns about how you were treated during the experiment, you may contact the 
office of the IRB, a committee that oversees the ethical aspects of the research process. The IRB 
office can be contacted at 828-227-7212. This research project has been approved by the IRB. 
Date: __________________ 
Your completion of the study indicates your consent to participate. 
 
Psy 150 Instructor:  _______________________________  
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Appendix B: Ambivalent Sexism Inventory 
Below is a series of statements concerning men and women and their relationships in 
contemporary society.  Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each 
statement using the following scale:   
 
 0  1  2  3  4  5 
     disagree           disagree      disagree               agree          agree           agree 
     strongly         somewhat          slightly               slightly            somewhat         strongly 
 
_____ 1.    No matter how accomplished he is, a man is not truly complete as a person  
        unless he has the love of a woman.   
 
_____ 2.    Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as hiring policies that   
        favor them over men, under the guise of asking for “equality.”  
 
_____ 3.    In a disaster, women ought not necessarily be rescued before men.   
 
_____ 4.    Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts being sexist.  
 
_____ 5.    Women are too easily offended. 
 
_____ 6.    People are often truly happy in life without being romantically involved with      
          a member of the opposite sex. 
 
_____ 7.    Feminists are not seeking for women to have more power than men.   
 
_____ 8.    Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess. 
 
_____ 9.    Women should be cherished and protected by men. 
 
_____ 10.  Most women fail to appreciate fully all that men do for them. 
 
_____ 11.  Women seek to gain power by getting control over men. 
 
_____  12.  Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores. 
 
_____ 13.  Men are complete without women. 
 
_____ 14.  Women exaggerate problems they have at work.   
 
_____ 15.  Once a woman gets a man to commit to her, she usually tries to put him on a  
        tight leash.   
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_____ 16.  When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about  
        being discriminated against.  
 
_____ 17.  A good woman should be set on a pedestal by her man. 
 
_____ 18.  There are actually very few women who get a kick out of teasing men by  
        seeming sexually available and then refusing male advances.   
 
_____ 19.  Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility. 
 
_____ 20.  Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well being in order to provide    
               financially for the women in their lives. 
 
_____ 21.  Feminists are making entirely reasonable demands of men. 
 
_____ 22.  Women, as compared to men, tend to have a more refined sense of culture  
               and good taste.   
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Appendix C: YouTube Video Links 
 
Videos for the Sexist Humor Condition.  
Betty White Snickers: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GkAnLtqWDhc 
Danel Tosh: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fomOtKxGkr8 (up to 28 seconds). 
The Man Show Wife School: http://www.yourdailymedia.com/post/the-man-show-wife-school/ 
Harry Enfield: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FNmBauXYzgc 
 
Videos for the Neutral Humor Condition. 
Betty White Snickers: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GkAnLtqWDhc 
E*Trade Baby Commercial: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ErPr99rOcec 
Laughing Baby: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N9oxmRT2YWw 
Spoon Phobia: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LaAZXPlv0u4 
 
 
 
 
 
